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Minority stockholders' suits have a bad name not only because they
disturb the tranquility of those in control of corporations and confuse
credit raters but because they are often an instrument of more or less
genteel blackmail. The existing alternatives to this procedure, however,
are full of menace to any society of free private enterprise. These alter-
natives are "bureaucratic" in the sense that they are continually ex-
tending the power of government officials over economic life.
If the system of free private enterprise in the modern world is a
delicate and shrinking plant, why bother with ways and means of sav-
ing it? Certainly the familiar arguments about its economic advantages
carry weight even though the stupendous expansion of bureaucratically
directed economies in Russia and Germany and Japan has diminished
the impressiveness of these arguments to *the layman. Apart from eco-
nomic calculations, however, certain moral and political aims may be
invoked to legitimize our concern for the discovery of non-bureaucratic
methods of corporate control.
The moral and political issue is freedom. The accredited spokes-
men of our society proclaim the dignity of the individual. Whatever
,discrepancies there are between profession and practice-and more than
our treatment of the Negro is at stake-we can still affirm without
hypocrisy that Americans believe in a commonwealth of equal oppor-
tunity.' Our institutions deserve respect when they have moral conse-
quences, that is to say when they contribute to a free society. A system of
free private enterprise can provide an economic basis of freedom. In a
competitive market the economic position of the individual depends
upon the comparatively impersonal play of the bargaining process.
Where monopoly prevails, either private or governmental, economics de-
pends on "politics", on clarifying and "pressuring" the officials of an
agency whose decisions are backed by potential coercion. Under these
I
1. For more details see Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, "Legal
Educatim and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest" (1943)
52 YALE L. J. 203.
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conditions men grow "diplomatic" in dealing with their superiors; they
cultivate compliance, not outspokenness.
2
In developing suitable methods of corporate control we have the
following principles in mind:
1. Strengthen the self-regulating tendencies of the market.
2. Adapt existing procedures to the problem as far as possible in preference
to the introduction of novelties.
3. Apply scientific and prudential rules of organization.
The great self-regulator of the market is rationally calculated self-
interest. The practical failure of free competition is often connected
with the failure of those who participate in the market to discern and
pursue their short- and long-term interest. If we can find non-bureau-
cratic ways of improving the rationality of judgment of more parties to
the bargaining process, we will be taking steps toward the solution of
our problem.
As an adaptation of existing procedures to the problem of control,
the minority stockholders' suit has something to be said in its favor. It
does proceed within the accepted framework of the market: business is
supposed to be done for the benefit of the investors.
In a sense, too, the minority stockholders' suit can be justified in
terms of certain scientific and prudential principles. The stockholders'
suit demands information about what it going on in the name of the
stockholders and this is fully in accord with the principle that if rational
judgments are to be made about self-interest there must be access to
relevant facts.
The suit, however, is limited by the circumstance that it is an ex-
traordinary measure. By invoking the machinery of litigation it brings
in the government as an ally not only in the quest for facts but under
circumstances that point toward liability, with all the threats implied.
Such proceedings should not be set in motion lightly or without pre-
liminary access to, and evaluation of, facts on the part of the parties
internal to the corporation. Up to the present our methods of internal
corporate control have not developed to the point of providing parties to
the enterprise with easy access to needed facts pertinent to the discovery
of self-interest and the criticism of policy. In connection with this prob-
lem, the general principle of democratic government is in point, namely,
2. Freedom is best served by a balanced, not a regimented, social structure;
not "one big boss" but many bargainers maintain liberty. For a well grounded ex-
position of these social relationships see GAETANO MOSCA, THE RULING CLASS
(1939), notably Chapter 5 on Juridical Defense.
1037
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
the need of an "opposition."3 By this is meant a group sufficiently well
informed to criticize the officeholders of the corporation, hence compell-
ing a balanced discussion of corporate policy. Existing limitations apply
not only to the stockholders at large but to many members of boards
who are often too dependent for facts upon information supplied by the
executives and managers of the corporation, or upon the dubious rumors
of the "grapevine."
In the absence of a well informed opposition to counterbalance the
officeholders, the control of a corporation tends to gravitate into fewer
and fewer hands. The ruling faction may represent one specific interest
or combination, perhaps of ownership, bondholding, commercial finan-
cing, perhaps of executives or managers. 4 The oligarchical tendencies
exhibited in the inner processes of corporate control conform to the
general tendencies of large-scale organizations; only a general opposition
can counteract them.5
Ever since the study by A. A. Berle, Jr. and Gardner Means, it has
been conventional to consider concentration tendencies within corpora-
tions as an instance of a supposed separation between ownership and con-
trol.6 Yet the facts now available suggest a different interpretation, at
least at the present stage of development. The immediate change is a
divorce between total ownership and minority ownership control. The
ruling faction continues to be an ownership faction, often a family group,
that hires and fires executives and managers, some of whom are gradu-
ally absorbed, often by marriage, into the ruling group.
7
General awareness of the concentration of policy-making inside cor-
porations had led to a dangerous state of affairs for the future of private
enterprise. More and more ownership interests grow inactive, tacitly
resigning their potential power to the active ownership-management
minority. But this is not the end of the matter. Our economic system
is subject to recurring crises in which it is put on the defensive, and
many of the passive ownership interests, despairing of any effective part
in shaping internal corporate policy, acquiesce in measures that expand
the role of government. The passivity of the stockholders at large, con-
3. See "The Function of the Opposition," in W. IVoR JENNINGS, CABINET Gov-
ERNMENT (1936) 384-388. "In fact, opposition and government are carried on
alike by agreement. The minority agrees that the majority must govern, and the
majority agrees that the minority should criticize" (p. 385).
4. By the nature of the facts it is difficult to arrive at a true picture of the
ruling factions at any given time. For indications see certain monographs of the
Temporary National Economic Committee, notably Nos. 11, 21, 29, 30, 39, 43.
5. For a classical exposition refer to ROBERTO MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES
(1915).
6. THE MODERN COR'ORATION AND PRIVATE PRoPERTv (1932).
7. See especially Monograph No. 29 of the TNEC, "The Distribution of Own-
ership in the 200 Largest Non-financial Corporations."
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venient as it may be to the ruling minority, devitalizes the free enterprise
system as a whole and prepares the way for passive resignation to the
bureaucratic state.
If more ownership interests are to be transformed from the passive
to the active mood, a stream of reliable facts must be at hand. For this
purpose the following suggestion is advanced: Establish a stockholders'
reporting service. Organize it on a non-profit professional fee basis.
Put it in charge of a board of men of nationally recognized integrity.
Develop a staff whose level of competence is that of such top-flight re-
search institutions as the National Bureau of Economic Research. Fi-
nance the staff not only from fees from professional reports, but from
funds publicly granted by private foundations and public-spirited in-
dividuals. One share of stock may be assigned to the institution by all
corporations with enough confidence in themselves and concern for the
future security of the system of free enterprise to endorse the basic
idea.
8
In evaluating this proposal it is necessary to weigh it on the scale
of relevant past experience and analysis. As usual, though, it is not easy
to find comparable situations, or situations, if comparable, that have been
adequately investigated. One question is whether the existence of the
agency might defeat its counter-monopoly purpose by increasing the
cost of capital to new and small enterprises. The reply is difficult in
view of our limited knowledge of the financing of such enterprises.9
There is some indication that most of the risk financing is done by a
small group of relatives and friends who would not be directly affected
by the existence of the new reporting service. They should benefit in-
directly in the degree to which the effect on large corporations of the
new procedure is to distribute funds more widely to stockholders, in this
way diminishing the practice of syphoning funds to the minority faction
and its friends.
Who can be expected to use a stockholders' reporting service, once
set up? May not the passivity of general ownership interests already be
so great that no one will avail himself of the proffered facilities? On
this point there is one encouraging sign. Interested groups are learning
to use the mechanism of the modern corporation as a means of policy in-
formation. I refer to the direct or indirect purchase of stock chiefly for
information purposes by customers, suppliers, competitors, labor unions,
8. When corporations do not cooperate, individual assignments of the share may
be received. In possession of the stock, the potential threat of a stockholders' suit
is present. Before that extremity, of course, it may be wise to denounce manage-
ments that undertake to bar access to significant information.
9. New facts will be available as the financial 'research program of the National
Bureau of Economic Research is executed.
1039
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
and other organized groups directly implicated in the far-flung network
of interest that links a vast corporation with its social environment.
These procedures are so new that they continue to operate somewhat be-
yond the spotlight of publicity. But the pressure for information is
genuine and unceasing, even though round-about and little-avowed.
What is proposed here is nothing more than a step toward regularizing
the semi-regular methods by which the fact-getting function is now per-
formed. One possible advantage of bringing these relations out into
the open is that the emerging control mechanisms of our corporate life
will be instrumented by men of conspicuous integrity and specialized
professional skill in the analysis of basic information. This is a special




-As a proposed substitute for minority stockholders' suits, Professor
- Lasswell suggests a non-bureaucratic alternative to minority stockhold-
ers' suits. In brief, the suggestion is that a stockholder reporting serv-
ice be established on a non-profit professional fee basis. The service
will be put in charge of a board of men of nationally known integrity
who would develop a staff with a high level of competence, financed
not only from fees from private reports but from funds granted by
private foundations and public spirited individuals.
Professor Lasswell asks, "If the system of free private enterprise
in the modern world is a delicate and shrinking plant, why bother with
ways and means of saving it ?", the implication being, it is assumed, that
if directors are not strong enough to withstand the harassment of minor-
ity stockholders' suits, the system of private enterprise itself should be
changed, because "the stupendous expansion of bureaucratically directed
economies in Russia and Germany and Japan has diminished the impres-
siveness of these arguments to the layman."
It is not the purpose of this short comment to indulge in a defense
of the system of private enterprise as developed in this country, inas-
much as Germany is daily receiving the answer, it is hoped that Japan
will receive it soon in greater measure and Stalin himself is reported
as toasting the productive efforts of American enterprise, without which
the war could not be won.
1040
STOCKHOLDERS' SUITS-A REPLY
While minority stockholders' suits have been known to the law for
some time, in their present virulent form they are a by-product of the
depression and of the high fees awarded by courts to the successful
practitioners in this field. The formula is simple: after the lapse of a
certain length of time, so that a number of the participants in the trans-
action are dead or unavailable as witnesses, and the memories of men
are dimmed by subsequent events, a stockholder who has just bought
a few shares of stock seeks out a lawyer (in many instances the lawyer
seeks out the stockholder) and proceeds to bring suit against one or
more directors or executives of the corporation. The allegation may
be that the directors or executives have taken unto themselves an en-
terprise, feeble and uncertain at first, but grown lusty with the years,
which should more properly have been undertaken by the corporation
itself. Or it is alleged that mistakes of judgment have been made or
errors of computation have occurred in connection with salaries, bon-
uses or incentive plans. Sometimes, but not always, it is intimated by
friends of the "Johnny come lately" 'stockholder that unpleasant pub-
licity may be avoided and harassing litigation circumvented if a settle-
ment is made with the plaintiff or his counsel. If settlement is made
on this basis, generally speaking the money does not reach the coffers
of the corporation. If a complaint should be filed, long and incon-
venient examinations of the officers and directors before trial may re-
sult; the time and attention of executive officers who are defendants may
be diverted from creative thought on the current affairs of the corpora-
tion, to the detriment of the stockholders, and the allegations of the
complaint including unsupported allegations of fraud (inserted solely
in an attempt to circumvent the running of the Statute of Limitations)
must be mentioned in current proxy literature to the confusion of the
stockholders.
Now difectors and executives of corporations represent a cross-
section of human nature. While it is believed that the vast majority
of directors and executive officers are conscientious in the performance
of their duties, it is always possible that they could have been mistaken
in their judgment as to what was a "corporate opportunity". In some
instances it is possible they were faithless to their trust or avaricious to
the detriment of the stockholders. But in the case of actions attacking
transactions which have taken place years ago, it is almost impossible to
reconstruct the events and to view them in the light of the morality of
the market place or business practices or knowledge of processes current
at the time the transaction took place, or to provide the court today
with a pair of spectacles which will restore the proper perspective.
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Many remedies have been proposed for the harassing nature of the
unwarranted minority stockholders' suit. Not because "free private
enterprise in the modern world is a delicate and shrinking plant". Far
from it. But because questions which are fundamentally matters of
judgment, to be decided by independent directors and the majority of
disinterested stockholders, are placed under the investigatory control
of a relatively new and small stockholder to whom the welfare of the
corporation is far less important than the possibility of a huge fee to be
obtained by his lawyer. Even Secretary Ickes complains that he has
found himself hampered in administering his Department by the run-
ning fire of Congressional investigatory committees, demands for the
production of records and key employees and the consumption of time
by investigations which might more profitably be devoted to construc-
tive work. And Ickes is no "delicate and shrinking plant".
Yet few would deny to the Congress the power of investigation.
And most students of the present phenomenon of minority stockholders'
suits hesitate to deprive the stockholder of a weapon by which real
breaches of trust or chicanery in corporate office may be discovered and
punished. One jurist before whom many of such cases have been tried,
while recognizing the harassing nature of such suits to executives cur-
rently engaged in attempting to make money for their stockholders, has
likened them to the gulls in the harbor and believes that they have a
certain therapeutic value in keeping corporate directors and executives
on the straight and narrow path.
In the years gone by, directors were supposed to bring to the man-
agement of corporate affairs ripe and mature business judgment, broad
business contacts, and a shrewd and penetrating power of analysis which
would be helpful to executives whose perspective might be limited by a
single corporate horizon. The increasing duties and liabilities placed
upon directors and the flood of minority stockholders' suits have made
it increasingly difficult to obtain the services of such directors, particu-
larly of men of means. And after all, if directors have little or no means,
or are corporate officers dependent on their salaries, then the most dire
civil penalties will be of no avail to the body of stockholders who may
have been mulcted.
Consequently, viewing the loss of such directors as detrimental to
society, various persons have suggested curbing, limiting or "outlawing"
the minority stockholders' suit without at the same time protecting fraud.
Professor Lasswell suggests an additional semi-public fact finding
agency.
Since the '20s the amount of information available to stockholders
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in this country has been greatly increased until today there is probably
no country in the world where as much information is available to the
general stockholder. Contrary to the general impression, corporate ac-
counting and corporate reporting is much more advanced in this country
than in England.
The Transportation Act of 1920, Securities Act of 1933, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Act of 1935, the
Corporate Reorganization Act of 1938, the Trust Indenture Act of
1939, the Investment Companies Act of 1940, the Federal Communica-
tions Act, the Civil Aeronautics Act and the myriad rules and regula-
tions issued by the various governmental departments and agencies ad-
ministering these and other acts have greatly added to the information
available to the government and to the stockholder. Professor Lasswell
recognizes this when he states:
"Interested groups are learning to use the mechanism of the modern corpora-
tion as a means of policy information. I refer to the direct or indirect purchase
of stock chiefly for information purposes (italics supplied) by customers, sup-
pliers, competitors, labor unions, and other organized groups directly implicated
in the farflung network of interest that links a vast corporation with its social
environment. These procedures are so new that they continue to operate some-
what beyond the spotlight of publicity. But the pressure for information is
genuine and unceasing, even though round-about and little-avowed."
At the same time Professor Lasswell states:
"Existing limitations apply not only to the stockholders at large but to many
members of boards who are often too dependent for facts upon information sup-
plied by the executives and managers of the corporation, or upon the dubious
rumors of the 'grapevine'."
If we are to meet the great challenge of our postwar world, our
corporate executives must not only be dynamic and creative, they must
be free to devote the major portion of their time to planning and produc-
tion. The time spent by executives in assembling information in ex-
aminations before trial, in actual testimony in open court and in the
actual preparation for such appearances is negligible compared to the
time subtracted from their creative moments by worry about the allega-
tions in minority stockholders' suits.
Let us suppose a minority stockholders' suit were threatened, and
the officers and directors involved were willing to let the proposed "stock-
holders' reporting service" have access to their correspondence, memo-
randa, books of account and testimony, further that the staff of the re-
porting service were 9 f high competence and integrity and would not
supply the information obtained to minority stockholders' lawyers (as
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has occurred in certain investigations). The report would not necessarily
be binding on the corporation, its stockholders or a court. Minority
stockholders could still use material in the report detrimental to the man-
agement and disregard the constructive findings of fact. The report
would not be res adjudicata with respect to such actions, it could not be
used in defense of suits brought in other jurisdictions, and it might not
be admissible in evidence. In one instance with which the writer is
familiar, the independent directors attempted to have all of the relative
facts submitted to a distinguished former Supreme Court Justice for
their guidance, but such report did not protect the management from
minority attack.'
Even where a majority of stockholders has full knowledge-indeed,
a fairly large percentage of the stockholders may have full cognizance
of the alleged dereliction of the management and be fully satisfied not
to have an action brought-there is at present no means whereby the
matter can be submitted to the stockholders with full and complete rev-
elation of the facts and final, binding action taken. So far, suggestions
made as to pre-trial procedure, pre-examination of the facts, etc., seem
merely to substitute an additional procedure for that already in vogue.
While Section 23(b) of the 'Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which
requires a stockholder bringing a minority action in the Federal courts
to prove that he was a stockholder at the time the alleged dereliction oc-
curred) may in theory work an injustice, as a practical matter in the
majority of cases it does not. And this is true even though the origin
of the rule may have been procedural rather than substantive. Other
suggestions have been made for limiting the amount of stock which a
stockholder must own before an action may be brought or requiring
the approval of a governmental agency which would make a pre-trial
examination of the facts as a condition precedent to the filing of the
complaint.
It is not the purpose of this brief comment to examine such other
suggested remedies, other than to say briefly that many of the remedies
so far proposed have been worse than the disease. The volume of such
litigation on the whole seems to have subsided and the body of prec-
edents which the-courts are building up may serve both as a deterrent
to additional stockholders wishing to try their luck at this bonanza and
to corporate officers and directors who may be tempted to forget their
duties. Much remains to be done in connection with clarifying the exact
relationship and duties of directors and executives in large organizations,
in agreeing upon the proper relationship between directors and manage-
-1. Piccard v. Sperry, 36 Fed. Supp. 1006 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).
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ment, and management and stockholders, and upon intelligent methods of
corporate reporting, in order that stockholders may have intelligent in-
formation in readily available form on which to base decisions, without
at the same time penalizing the corporation in its relationships with its
competitors.
If there is to be a remedy it must provide finality. Otherwise it will
only involve additional work with no certainty of result. Professor
Lasswell's proposal would not provide finality. If not exceedingly well
executed it could do great harm. More and better questionnaires cer-
tainly will not provide the answer.
A Third Viewpoint
DAVID L. PODELL
,"Bureaucracy" has not a friend in the democratic world. For that
reason it lends itself ideally to the political arena as an epithet which may
be hurled back and forth to the discomfiture of the party in control.
"Free enterprise" is another one of those elusive, sugar-coated and de-
liciously flavored political battle phrases. It is universally acclaimed
because it is usually interpreted as indicating freedom from anything
that is irksome to the particular group or individual. The monopolist
would be free from anti-trust laws. The industrialist would be free
from taxes and other such nuisances. The corporate director would be
free from stockholders' suits and government supervision. Dr. Lass-
well's search for a "non-bureaucratic" alternative and Mr. Dean's reply
remind one of the story of the two ardent Republicans who, after a lively
discussion, emerged from the contest with the firm conviction that the
Democrats are all villanous.
Not all government bureaus are evil, nor are all corporate man-
agers, nor all stockholders' suits. Each in its turn has suffered an ample
measure of abuse and misuse. Each in its turn has through the years
made substantial contribution toward the development of a social con-
sciousness and fiduciary responsibility in the management of "other
peoples' money."
Almost a half century ago, an ultra-conservative economist-none




"If the managers of an enterprise are allowed to use other peoples' money
while they risk comparatively little of their own, a number of serious evils will
inevitably follow. They will persuade the public to engage in enterprises which
are doomed to failure in advance, in the hope that they may themselves make
a temporary profit out of their management, either in the form of large salaries
or of lucrative personal contracts, or they may so manipulate the finances of
the companies which they control as to make a personal profit out of fluctua-
tions in the value of their securities. These possibilities form a temptation
to waste the investor's private capital and what is far worse, to misuse an ap-
preciable part of the public capital. The former causes loss to the individual in-
vestors directly concerned, the latter affects the whole community, consumers
as well as investors, by preventing the national resources from being properly
utilized. This danger is most inadequately met in the United States. There
are few localities where either law or public sentiment does much to check
this. In this respect America is far behind other countries.
"In most parts of Europe these evils are avoided or mitigated by holding the
promoters of new concerns responsible for the correctness of their manipula-
tions and by making it a crime for them to divert the money of investors to
their own uses by lucrative private contracts."'
As Mr. Dean demonstrates, private industry is anything but a deli-
cate and shrinking plant. Within our own generation it has suffered and
survived the severest punishment in its history, largely visited upon it
by the Kreugers, the Insulls, the Musicas and the Hopsons. These were
stars of the first magnitude, shining over vast financial and industrial
empires. There were many lesser luminaries. Private industry en-
dured the severest resultant depression. It survived a flood of stock-
holders' suits that swept the country and roused the investors from
their passivity.
One of the major reasons for this survival, if we examine recent
history in its true perspective, is to be found in government regulation
which has often been dubbed "bureaucracy." The expos6 commenced
with the Pecora investigation before a Legislative Committee of the
Congress. That was soon followed by the Securities Act of '33 and the
Securities Exchange Act of '34. Prior to those enactments, the Gov-
ernors of the Stock Exchange were not merely a private bureaucracy;
they were a complete autocracy, and to all intents and purposes above
and beyond the reach of the law.
Since the enactment of these regulatory statutes our security ex-
changes, after going through a severe cleansing, have settled down to a
level where they have never been on a sounder basis, and we have wit-
nessed a capacity for production by private industry which is nothing
short of miraculous. This has been accompanied by an upsurge in the
1. HADLEY, EcoNoMics (1897).
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security markets which has been strangely free from parasitic fly-by-
nights.
As one who has served in a department of the Federal government
and who has defended directors, and who has presented stockholders'
grievances, the writer has not the slightest hesitation in declaring that
by far the most difficult and burdensome path in the field of corporate
law is that which must be followed by the stockholder who seeks to in-
voke the only civil remedy available, the derivative suit. Mr. Dean's
design of the simple pattern for the stockholder's action is indeed il-
luminating. One can see the stockholders and their lawyers lying low
and marking time to wait for the day when the directors will be dead
and the records will be destroyed, then pouncing upon the helpless cor-
poration and its directors with the full majesty of the law. Of course,
Mr. Kreuger shouted his chicanery from the housetops, and no stock-
holder thought of suing until he had, in sheer desperation, committed
suicide. And yet, how much suffering and misery would have been
spared if some "Johnny-Come-Lately" stockholder, whether he owned
ten or ten thousand shares, had been able to halt Kreuger in his tracks in
the early twenties, when he began his thieveries, provided only that he
did not connive with Kreuger or his management in making a stealthy
private settlement, and had the intestinal fortitude to fight his case
through-always against tremendous odds. The fees, no matter how
liberal, would have sunk into insignificance compared to the billion dol-
lars or more he might have saved American investors alone.
A disinterested private research bureau, fully alive to its opportuni-
ties for public service, functioning as suggested by Dr. Lasswell, might
well have thrown some light on the manipulations of the financial heroes
named above and their various counterparts before they had progressed
so far as to bring the financial world to the brink of ruin, and before
they brought disrepute to the vast body of capable and conscientious
corporate managers. The probability is strong, however, that such a
bureau, not implemented by any legal weapons, would have encountered
insurmountable difficulty in any effort to break through to the inner
sanctum of financial knowledge and power.
If private settlements of stockholders' suits are conducive to various
abuses, they can and should be banned. On the other hand, the full bur-
den of retrieving the corporate assets for the benefit of the corporation
should not be thrown upon the individual stockholder who determines to
litigate. He should be in a position to enlist the aid of some govern-
ment agency with full power to gather and supply the essential facts of
any given situation. The writer endorses as particularly applicable to
1017
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
derivative suits, the statement of Judge Wyzanski in the case of Crosby
Steam Gauge & Valve Co. v. Manning,2 where he declared:
"Recent investigations . . . have shown how often the private defendant is
helpless adequately to present its case against a monopolistic use of a patent.
".. . it is none too early for the Courts to modify their procedures so that
there may be a more realistic trial of the complex issues of economic fact and
industrial policy. ....
".. . judges must be willing to hear from more than the conventional parties
in an adversary procedure, to receive expert suggestions from specialized
governmental agencies, to accept economic testimony appropriate for laying
down a broad rule of industrial government and to frame decrees suited to the
character of the many dimensions of the problem revealed."
Dr. Lasswell's disinterested, non-profit making group to observe
and report on management of corporate affairs should be welcomed, not
as an alternative to anything, but rather as an added contribution to that
eternal vigilance which is the price of true freedom in the conduct of
private corporate enterprise.
As we approach the critical Post-War Reconstruction period it is
well to keep in mind the words of Chief Justice Stone when in 1934 he
declared:
"I venture to assert that when the history of the financial era which has just
drawn to a close comes to be written, most of its mistakes and major faults
will be ascribed to the failure to observe the fiduciary principle, the precept
as old as holy writ that 'a man cannot serve two masters'. The separation of
ownership from management, the development of the corporate structure so as
to vest in small groups control of the resources of great numbers of small unin-
formed investors make imperative a fresh and active devotion to that principle
if the modern world of business is to perform its proper function."3
2. 51 F. Supp. 972, 974 (D. Mass. 1943).
3. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar (1934) 48 HARV. L. Rlv. 1, 8.
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